Feature

Risky Businesses

Assessing risks can be hard, but deciding what to do about them at individual, local and national level can be even harder.

The questions raised by attempts to assess risk and manage it are difficult ones. A recent conference on Risk Assessment: Perceptions and Science looked at a range of issues related to this, from the "certainty of uncertainty" through to national and international implications.

Developing public policy on how to asses risk and then manage it is a major concern around the world. Those involved have to balance between under-estimating and over-estimating risks -- both of which can have dire and unforeseen consequences. They have to find a way to evaluate the often-conflicting information that is produced and understand the levels of uncertainty involved. They have to convey that information to the public in a credible fashion and look at what can be done in the future to address the varying concerns.

In an increasing number of cases, analysts are working on the "economics of being scared", as outlined by Cath Wallace, of Victoria University's School of Business and Public Management.

"It makes sense in an economic sense to not allow something with catastrophic effects to be done even if the probability [of adverse effects] is very low," she says.

This precautionary principle has become familiar in international circles through debate over proposed responses to global climate change. Given the potential magnitude of the effect postulated, the precautionary principle states that it would be prudent to make appropriate changes in those activities seen to be contributing to global warming. While the debate in the science arena continues over the nature, mechanism and magnitude of any warming, debate also continues politically over what, if any, changes will be made to ameliorate that warming.

With global warming, as with many other areas of risk assessment, the nature of the risks is highly uncertain, as is the degree to which one should respond on an individual or national level. In addition, the long-term nature of such events can lead to indecision or apathy when attempting to formulate policy to deal with them.

One's perceived vulnerability to disasters, particularly natural hazards, is often a product of our personal experiences, according to psychologist Dr John McClure of Victoria University. Experiencing a flood, for example, reduces the often overly high optimism that "it can't happen to me". This can have beneficial effects in encouraging people to plan ahead and take appropriate precautions, which in turns provides a feeling of greater control.

If the control of the risk is external, then an unhealthy fatalism can result, says McClure. People can opt out of lowering risks themselves by believing that any disaster is in the hand of fate or the government or any other outside agency. This can lead to a sense of helplessness and an unwillingness to take what control measures are available. In many cases, the amount of risk is consistently over-estimated, and this is also a problem in areas where the actual risk levels are uncertain.

Public Perceptions

In discussing perceptions of risk, one problem often encountered is public distrust of official pronouncements, whether made by public or private organisations. Widespread publicity of inappropriate reassurances in the past have led to general suspicion.

Mark Tweedale, formerly a professor of risk engineering at Sydney University, sums this up succinctly when he notes that the person talking about acceptable risk is almost certainly the person creating that risk in the first place. He stresses the need for an open and transparent process of setting risks and deciding whether they are generally acceptable. As such, intangible risks have to be considered as a part of the overall risk assessment and these have to be placed in context, with involvement from all parties concerned.

"That's difficult, but it may take some heat out of the arguments," he says.

Part of the problem is in defining what makes a risk acceptable and who gets to decide.

"An acceptable risk is one which is accepted by those exposed, provided they are fully informed about the nature of the risk," says Wayne Hastie of the Wellington Regional Council. The key thing is to ensure that sufficient information is available for informed decision-making.

Dr Philippa Howden-Chapman, of the Health and Public Policy Unit of the Wellington School of Medicine, agrees with the importance of involving the broad range of stakeholders in considering issues where risk is a concern. As part of this process, she maintains that those involved have to acknowledge that uncertainty is a factor, that values can differ between the different stakeholder groups and that a certain amount of emotional involvement is likely in areas where the risks and uncertainties -- and consequently the stakes -- are perceived as high.

She cites potentially disturbing research which suggests that, in many cases, the provision of extra information on contentious issues does nothing to change the original attitudes of the people involved. Often decisions are made on the basis of who people trust -- family and friends, for example -- rather than on who has the most accurate or most complete information. However, there is research to show that when people are asked to explain how they arrive at their decision, their overall judgement tends to improve.

Under the Resource Management Act, many activities that have a risk of adverse environmental impact are the subject of a publicly notified process which does try to gather the views of interested parties. Unfortunately, according to Associate Professor Yvonne van Roy of Victoria University's Law Department, that collection of information is often too late.

"The public submissions process is already too late as you're having to argue against something by that stage," she notes. She was involved in the debates over the proposed introduction of rabbit calicivirus disease into New Zealand, and noted that the 850 submissions made on the issue showed its high level of interest for the public. In an area where opinions were strong on both sides and where the science was equivocal at beast, van Roy maintains that it is vital that independent critical opinion is available.

Scientists were once seen as providing an independent voice, but the level of public trust in scientists per se has decreased over the past four decades. It is common for the public to take the lead on environmental risk stories from the media and from environmental organisations who are seen as the independent watchdogs on areas ranging from animal experimentation to resource use issues.

Scientists' Concerns

Dr Chris Sissons, from the New Zealand Association of Scientists, has concerns about the potential for non-scientific debate or scientific non-debate, both of which result in problems. Like many of the scientists speaking at the risk conference, he stresses the need for a general awareness of the role that uncertainty plays in science.

Another concern is the tendency for people to focus on positive results and favourable outcomes and ignore conflicting evidence or unfavourable possibilities. This is a hotly debated issue in science itself, but has major implications when science developed in this fashion is used in the public arena.

Sissons says that the RCD debate provided a good example of this, where those keen to introduce the virus were happy to talk about high kill rates and loathe to mention the extreme variability in the kill rate. The decision to refuse the introduction of RCD was a wise one on scientific grounds, says Sissons, given the depth of ignorance about the virus itself, its transmission mechanisms and its effectiveness, but the scientific opinion was overruled by public action.

Ignorance and uncertainty were a problem for those scientists attempting to assess the risks inherent in bovine spongiform encephalopathy -- more familiarly known as "mad cow disease" -- and its implications in human Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease. Scientists found it frustrating in trying to balance the difficult job of providing information and assessing risks in an area of extreme uncertainty. Add to that the extreme public interest and strong pressures at government level for action and you run the danger of losing public esteem for scientific advice, warns Professor David Skegg, of Otago University's Department of Preventive and Social Medicine.

"It is vital in health, as in other areas, that scientists should not tailor their advice to what the government wants to hear," he says, adding that scientists should not make assertions about risks that cannot be scientifically justified.

Even when all the information is provided, it is not necessarily taken up. Dr Colin Feek of the Ministry of Health notes that despite releasing as much information as they had about BSE and CJD, the ministry still bore the brunt of newspaper headlines such as "Why not tell the truth on the CJD scare?". Anger in the press and amongst the public followed, particularly when the possible contamination of the New Zealand blood supply was revealed. Feek says that it is necessary to take into account "outrage factors" in dealing with contentious issues, and that it is vital that organisations are see to be honest, competent and concern with the involvement of the community.

During the CJD scare, New Zealand's blood products were recalled from across the country and dumped. John Dagger, who was involved with the recall, says that there were major problems in explaining what the potential risks were from one donor who had subsequently died from CJD. The risk was theoretical, at levels too small to measure, but this did not necessarily pacify the people who had received blood products during that period.

One of these was Dagger's haemophiliac son, whose question then is one which continues to underlie all the discussions of potentially risky ventures -- "what is the alternative?".

Vicki Hyde, NZSM

Vicki Hyde is the editor of New Zealand Science Monthly.